Bo Knows Low-Variance Football. So Does Jim.

Jim Schwartz, on why the Lions have scored more points in the fourth quarter than the first three in all of their games so far:

"We've had to in the fourth. We've been behind and that's put the pressure on us to have to do it. We're trying just as hard in the first quarter. Certainly no design or scheme or anything like that. We have to be efficient all four quarters and it can make a difference for us if we can get a lead and we can hold a lead. But we've got to battle for 60 minutes. You're judged just like a 16 game season, you're judged on all 16 games, you're judged on all 60 minutes. So no matter where you're scoring them they all count."

“We’ve had to in the fourth.”

Schwartz says it’s “no design or scheme or anything like that,” but the Lions’ close games are the result of obvious changes in approach on offense.

The biggest change from last season to this season is the way defenses are playing the Lions—and all of last season’s 5,000-yard passing offenses. The Saints, Patriots and Lions went 36-10 last season; through Week 6 of this season they’re 6-10. NFL defensive coordinators are paid way too much to let teams beat them with the same thing over and over—so they’re taking away the bombs-away offense and forcing these teams to adjust.

The Lions have adjusted by re-emphasizing the run game, drastically cutting back on hopeful shots downfield, and trying to emphasize intermediate routes. Linehan has also been doing a lot of “setting up” defenses with repetitive/predictable playcalls early in games, to subvert them later—or in the case of this play broken down by TuffLynx at Pride of Detroit, use repetitive/predictable playcalls in early games, to subvert them in later games.

By taking fewer risks and being less aggressive on offense, the Lions are pursuing a low-variance strategy.

This concept has been discussed all over the Internet, but it was synthesized best for me by Brian Cook at MGoBlog, in a piece called “Keep it Close and Lose in the Fourth Quarter," and its follow-up, "Mathy Mailbag." Read them both, plus all the links in both if you really want to grok this.

To summarize: low-variance strategies result in fewer possible outcomes. Two equally-matched teams both running more often than they pass and always punting on fourth down regardless of field position and never blitzing on defense won’t produce a 48-0 blowout in either direction.

This is, as discussed by Cook, Chris Brown, and Malcom Gladwell a “Goliath strategy.” When you’ve got a massive talent and skill advantage—as Goliath did over David—you want to eliminate the chance of anything crazy happening. Since the expected outcome is “you win,” you want to maximize the probability of getting the expected outcome.

As Cook notes, this is the strategy used by Bo Schembechler at Michigan: grind it out, play suffocating defense, take few risks, minimize mistakes, and use your massive size and talent advantage to consistently beat opponents with execution. Cook cited a passage from a book called Bo’s Lasting Lessons, wherein Bo, at a coaching clinic, veered dangerously close to schematic enlightenment before reaffirming his fevered belief in fundamentals and “playing Michigan football.” Cook:

This may have been brilliant in 1985, and brilliant against the poor, huddled masses that comprised Michigan's opponents at the time, but it's fundamentally a variance-hating strategy that presumes better talent. In it are the seeds of Michigan's time-honored failure against Rose Bowl foes, and its recent struggles to put away inferior competition.

It’s that old chestnut, attributed to darn near every midwestern football coach of historical note: “Only three things can happen when you pass the ball and two of them are bad.” Passing is a high-risk, high-variance strategy.

No NFL team passed more, or more often, than the Lions did in 2011.

This is why the Lions aren’t  doing it again in 2012: the Lions can assume a talent advantage over most NFL teams. They just beat the Eagles, one of the most talented teams in football, and Jeff McLane of the Philadelphia Inquirer wrote you could “see” the Lions were “physically dominant.” This is why the Lions passing twice as often as they run would be dumb, and playing things close to the vest is smart.

But.

One of the side effects of playing for low variance by running the ball a lot, making ultra-conservative fourth-down calls and, I don’t know, refusing to try an onside kick when you’re kicking from the opponent’s forty-yard line is that you shorten the game. With more time running off the clock, there are fewer plays and possessions—fewer chances to press your advantage.

If you flip a coin that’s weighted to land on “heads” 60% of the time 10,000 times, it will land on heads 60% of those 10,000 flips. If you flip that same coin ten times, it’s much more likely to land on heads for some other percentage.

If you reduce the number of ‘trials’, you increase the chance for an unexpected outcome. That is to say, if the Lions have an advantage over their opponent, attempting to control the clock gives them fewer chances to leverage that advantage. Re-stated again: by playing to reduce risk, the Lions can’t blow people out like they used to. They’re also not going to get blown out, but that’s cold comfort when you’re starting 2-3 instead of 5-0.

As a consequence, the Lions are running into the same problem Lloyd Carr did: if you’re going to keep it close for four quarters, you actually have to execute significantly better than the other team. Bo's reliance superior talent and execution left him unarmed against opponents with equal talent. Carr's similar approach with less-superior talent against less-hapless Big Ten opponents guaranteed him at least one embarrassing upset a season.

The Lions let the Rams hang around when Stafford throwing three first-half interceptions, and it almost cost them. The Lions were on track to beat the Titans 27-20 and the Vikings 13-6 except, you know, two punt return touchdowns, two kickoff return touchdowns, and a fumble return touchdown. By playing it close to the vest, the Lions couldn't build up the kind of lead that can withstand these freak occurrences/horrible mistakes. They have to get touchdowns from their early scoring opportunities and not settle for field goals.

Still, throughout these games, the Lions’ advantage has become apparent in the final stanza: Mikel Leshoure and Joique Bell punishing bruised defenses, Matthew Stafford and Shaun Hill carving up beleaguered secondaries downfield, shellshocked quarterbacks running for their lives and throwing picks.

Over the course of the season, the weird bounces and fluky breaks will even out. Stafford quickly eliminated the terrible picks of the Rams game, and the coverage teams managed to go a whole game without allowing a single return touchdown. The Lions are taking the correct approach—but they’re going to have to improve their offensive execution, or continue dropping games to inferior opponents.

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Nick Injured? It’s Fairley Insigificant

Nick Fairley showed up to this morning’s practice in a walking boot, obviously unable to work. Confirmed by a  Tweet from the Detroit News’ Chris McCosky, the previously-thought-to-be-minor injury became a possible stress fracture. To steal a meme from MGoBlog:

PANIC?

No, no panic. For starters, this is training camp—bumps and bruises happen. For seconds, this training camp comes after the longest absolutely-no-work layoff in modern NFL history. Normally, these guys have already gone through several sessions of “no contact” (but actually mostly full speed) OTAs, plus a full minicamp. The player-only workouts were just conditioning and 7-on-7 stuff; this is the first real football of 2011 and it’s already August. There were bound to be more nicks and dings than usual.

Here's the other thing: depth. Remember The Parable Of The One-Eyed Beggar? This is partly why the Lions have Corey Williams AND Ndamukong Suh AND Sammie Hill AND Nick Fairley AND Andre Fluellen: so that they can lose one or two of those guys for a while without much of a dropoff.

The flipside is that the Lions’ defensive line must keep rolling waves, so they’ll need Fairley back—but not the way they needed Ndamukong Suh last season. Suh played a thousand snaps, nearly every single down the defense was on the field last season. Fairley was never going to carry that big of a load even if he showed up to camp in the best shape of his life, dominated every rep, and didn’t suffer so much as a paper cut. He’s an extremely talented player and he seems like a nice, fun-loving guy—but he doesn’t need to be an All-Pro for the Lions to have a good defense this year.

If you want to read the tea leaves for how this season’s going to go, don’t scour the injury report, check out Tom Kowalski’s first “Camp Observations” posts:

An interesting play developed during the first period of team work. The Lions' offense went to the line of scrimmage and center Dominic Raiola changed the call. Safety Louis Delmas sensed something and quickly changed the defensive call and shifted the defensive alignment. Seeing that, Raiola quickly reverted back to the original call and snapped the ball. It was a running play wide left and Jahvid Best broke it for a long gainer, bringing cheers from the crowd.

I love every single thing about that quote. I love that we see the value of Raiola: there are bigger centers who can run block better, but he improves the whole offense with his ability to read a defense and change the protection—or even the play. It’ll never show up on a stat sheet, or even in Pro Football Focus’s grades, but it Dominic Raiola brings a wealth of value to this team that that cannot be denied.

Second, I love that Louis Delmas is maturing. His groin healed from last season, allowing him to again play like “Da Missile” we saw in 2009—but he’s coming into his own as a complete safety now. He has the recognition skills and leadership ability to put the rest of the defense in position to succeed; he’s not just flying around putting shoulders into people.

Third, I love that Jahvid Best can still hit the home run. We didn’t see much of his “jets” after the first few games, but I believe he’s going to make a believer out of everyone this year. Delmas and Best were two guys who were supposed to be huge for the Lions last year, and they weren’t. If they can play at the level described above, they’ll improve the team just as much as Tulloch, Durant, or any of the offseason additions.

Technorati Tags: nfl,training camp,detroit lions,louis delmas,dominic raiola,jahvid best,nick fairley

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watchtower Review: Lions vs. Jets

Well, last week’s Watchtower had an obvious error:

My instincts tell me that a team the Packers shut out at home won’t put up 24-27 against this defense in front of a sold-out Ford Field. Despite all the ways I could be proven wrong, I’m going to go with the data and my gut. The most likely outcome of the game is a 17-13 Lions win.

Durr Sharks?

Durr Sharks.

On the positive side, this is only the second game I’ve been wrong enough on to actually get the winner incorrect.  On the negative side, damn.  I’ll admit, I did not think Sanchez had that just-before-halftime bomb in him.  Not only did it unquestionably deflate the crowd, and reverse the tide of momentum as they went into the lockers, it also accounted for a huge percentage of the Jets’ offense that day.  That pass was the difference between 336 yards passing and 262 yards passing.  It was the difference between 8.62 YpA and 6.89 YpA.  It was the difference between 23 points and 16 points.  It was the difference in the game.

If we assume that the 2004-2005 Chargers provide a representative sample of Brian Schottenheimer’s schematic and playcalling tendencies, the Jets’s offense will either meet—or vastly underperform—expectations against Gunther Cunningham’s aggressive 4-3 defense, depending on which phase of the offense the Lions attack. Given the recent success of the Lions’ pass rush and secondary, I expect the Lions to attack the pass—and therefore, I project the Jets to score 10-13 points. Unfortunately, because we’re working off of a possibly fallacious assumption—the 2004-2005 Chargers’s offense being interchangeable with the 2010 Jets—I have very low confidence in this projection. If there were no systemic advantage or disavantage, the expectation for the Jets’ offense against the Lions’ defense would be 24-27 points.

Okay so.  The assumption has been proven fallacious.  [[ Martyball == Brianball ]] returns false.  Looks like either there’s no systemic advantage or disadvantage for Gunther against Brian Schottenheimer, or that one lapse in coverage threw everything out of whack.  Either way, this half gets a grade of FAIL.

With no systemic advantage or disadvantage, expectations for the Lions’ offense versus the Jets’ defense would be set at 17-21 points. However, if we apply this perceived disadvantage when facing Rex Ryan defenses, I project the Lions will score 15-17 points. I have low-to-medium confidence in this projection.

This is not a big surprise; the only data point for Linehan against Ryan was the 2007 Rams, after they’d lost Steven Jackson and anyone else who had any shot of being a productive offensive football player.  The only reasons I considered a possible advantage in effect were: A) how mediocre the Ravens’ defense was that season, and B) how thoroughly said defense scoured the Earth clean of Gus Frerotte on that day.

Lessons Learned:

Seems like I have to keep learning this one, but: if you have very low confidence in your analysis because of sample size or mitigating factors, do not roll with it anyway because it sounds right.

Technorati Tags: nfl,detroit lions,new york jets,rex ryan,brian schottenheimer,jim schwartz,scott linehan,gunther cunningham

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Three Cups Deep: The Eye of the Hurricane

With the weekend’s whirlwind of roster moves giving way to a holiday calm, we have  a moment to reflect on where the Lions are at, and where they’re going—as they forge into the vicious winds of Solider Field.  Sports Illustrated’s Damon Hack broke down the Lions, and their chances for success in 2010, on last night’s Fireside Chat podcast.

In my post-interview segment, I had a brain fart and started talking about the Lions’ newest defensive back, Alphonso Smith, as if he was selected in the 2010 draft instead of the 2009.  As soon as I realized my mistake, I wondered where my wires got crossed . . . it didn’t take me long to remember.

Last season, Steve of Detroit Lions Weblog and I collaborated in a blogger mock draft, and who was our second-round selection?  None other than Alphonso Smith.  Here’s what I said at the time:

Smith possesses all the tools of a prime time NFL cover corner: blazing speed, great short-area burst, confidence, and a nose for the ball. To make a long story short, Smith looks like Dre' Bly all over again, minus (offically speaking) one inch of height. 5'-9" is really small, especially since that's an "official" height. We'll see what happens when he weighs in at the combine, but for now the height gives me pause.  [Steve] and I were wearing our Martin Mayhew/Shack Harris caps (golly, who was who?), trying to draft as we think the Lions will.

One of the justifications for my controversial selection of Josh Freeman in the first round, was that I thought Smith might still be here for us at this pick--and he is. Smith is also a dangerous return man, so even if he doesn't start, or begins his career as a nickel back, he'll be have a chance to make an immediate impact in another desperate need area. Moreover, Smith possesses the attitude--if not the frame--to be excellent in run support. Despite his size, he's very strong and physical . . . I think he needs to go to the vet, because his pythons are sick (apologies to Colin Cowherd).

Of course, I said all that stuff in defense of taking him over the eventual Defensive Rookie of the Year, Clay Matthews, so, y'know, take that with a grain of salt.

If Smith truly is a younger Bly, he’ll compete for time immediately—but his one-year tenure in Denver suggests he’s not anything of the kind.  Then again, the Falcons gave up on Chris Houston after just two years, and he’s working out great so far; perhaps the Lions are just more willing to give cornerbacks the time they need to develop.  Yeah.  Let’s go with that.

A couple of housecleaning notes: first, a recent flurry of excellent comments has gone unreplied to (DrewsLions, Matt, et al.).  I’m working on it.  That, and a recent MGoBlog post has inspired me to go back into my inbox and take care of some flummoxing old emails of my own.  Also, I’m updating the Detroit Lions Jersey Menagerie.  All of that, a Watchtower, and more, coming this week.

The far eyewall approaches; the turbulent winds of Solider Field howl.  Our men in Honolulu Blue will brave them on the way to victory—are you ready to follow them?  I am.  Let’s do this thing.

Technorati Tags: nfl,detroit lions,sports illustrated,alphonso smith,clay matthews

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Dré Bly is Not a Cancer (He’s a Gemini)

One of the interesting things about the blogosphere is the “echo chamber” effect.  In  media, the “echo chamber” is a phenomenon where a rumor makes its way to a media source, who shares it or alludes to it, some media outlets report the rumor, many media outlets report on reports of the rumor, and eventually the sheer volume of reports bouncing off of each other become (presumptive) truth.  An example: the IrishCentral.com report that  Brian Kelly would be hired at Notre Dame, which got picked up by the Cleveland Plain-Dealer, and then the Detroit News, and then they all reported each other reporting this report that, as far as anyone knew, was only a solid guess by some dude’s alias—Sean O’Shea—at a website about everything Irish.  Not everything Notre Dame Fighting Irish, just . . . Irish.

Brian at MGoBlog completely blew up everyone involved in the O’Shea/Kelly echo chamber incident at the time, and deservedly so.  This, though, is an example of the blogging version of an “echo chamber”: since many blogs analyze news rather than report news, one blog will react to another, yet another will react to the other’s reaction, and pretty soon you have analysis of analysis of analysis of analysis . . . whether that’s better or worse than Sean O’Shea taking a well-informed shot in the dark that ricochets all over the media is debatable.

On Sunday, Tom Kowalski at Mlive.com broke down Dré Bly, as he’s done for many key/interesting Lions this offseason.  Besides some cogent, rational analysis of his skills and how they’ve aged, Killer addressed Bly’s character:

There is a notion that Bly might be something of a lockerroom cancer, but just the opposite is true. More than 90 percent of the people in the organization believed the same thing Bly did. Harrington was far from the only reason the Lions were having their issues but, because of his position, Harrington was at the center of it.

Michael David Smith over at ProFootballTalk read Killer’s Bly piece, and posted his reaction take within a few hours:

“For starters, if 90 percent of the people in the Lions' organization really agreed with Bly that ‘Millen did a great job drafting the guys,’ well, then I don't even know what to say . . .”

“None of this is to say that Harrington was a good quarterback in Detroit. He wasn't. But he was far from the only problem. And if 90 percent of the Lions' locker room in 2005 thought Harrington was the "whole problem," that just shows what a clueless group of players the Lions had. Now they've brought one of those clueless players back.”

Well, let’s hope analysis is more like parfaits, and less like onions . . . or ogres.

Let’s re-read that last sentence of Killer’s: “Harrington was far from the only reason the Lions were having their issues but, because of his position, Harrington was at the center of it.”  Yes, because of his position.  Because of his salary.  Because of his repeated failure to progress within the offense.  Because his head coach wanted nothing to do with him, and never did.  Because the front office ceded to the coach’s demands to bring in Jeff Garcia.  Because Jeff Garcia got hurt and blew chunks.  Because Matt Millen refused to admit his mistake.  Because Millen compounded his mistake over and over and over again by refusing to admit it.

Quarterbacks the lynchpin of a football team.  They touch the ball on every offensive play.  Great quarterbacking can elevate mediocre teams to the very summit of the NFL, and bad quarterback play makes everything else irrelevant.  Consequently, quarterbacks are lightning rods for public praise and criticism.  No NFL player will ever be as worshipfully adored as Brett Favre was by Green Bay—and perhaps none will be as viciously despised as Favre now is by Green Bay.

Joey Harrington wasn’t just a quarterback, he was a number three overall draft pick quarterback.  He was a franchise savior, a harbinger and herald of bright futures and blue skies.  He was paid lavishly, he was handed the the keys to the franchise—and he was absolutely unwanted.  The fans didn’t want him.  His teammates didn’t want him.  His coach didn’t want him, either (Marty Mornhinweg, on that fateful draft day, told Kowalski he was behind Harrington’s selection--but later admitted he was flim-flamming).

Not only did Harrington’s failure to click get earn Mornhinweg an awkward dismissal, Matt Millen’s pet project got Steve Mariucci run as well.  With all the drafts from 2003-2005 focusing on “giving Harrington weapons,” and not, for example, restocking the defense, a team that was finally starting to move in a positive direction got dragged back down to the bottom.

"WHAT?" you say. "Positive direction?  During the Millen Era?" Mr. David Smith’s skepticism above not withstanding . . . yeah, positive direction.  In 2004, the Lions had the 18th-best scoring defense in the NFL—which is only mediocre, but it was the last time the Lions’ defense looked nearly so good.  It was also the second-closest thing to a winning season the Lions got in the Aughts.  The 2004 season included a 4-2 start, two road wins, and a season sweep of the Chicago Bears.  Six of the ten losses were by a touchdown or less!  Yes, there was definitely positive momentum heading into 2005.

So what happened?  First, a nice opening win against the Packers—then a horrific 5-INT Harrington implosion against the Bears.  There was an only-the-Lions-get-screwed-like-this Week 3 bye to marinate on it . . . and then, a robbery.  Man, oh man, if I’d been blogging back then, you folks would have needed eye bleach to wash out the vicious, nasty things I’d have written about the Buccaneers’ 17-13 “defeat” of the Lions.

It was Harrington’s first signature comeback drive, an efficient 81-yard march ending with a well-placed 12-yard touchdown pass—that got taken away by review.  Despite the play being ruled a touchdown on the field, and the ball being in Pollard’s hands while he was in bounds, the ref overturned the call, and the Lions’ season momentum evaporated. 

Obviously, Joey Harrington was not then, never became, and likely never would have become a great NFL quarterback.  But flip that one bit from “0” to “1”, and instead of the Thanksgiving Day loss to the Falcons sealing Mariucci’s fate, it’d have been the first time the Lions dipped below .500.  Yes, that’s right: if that touchdown doesn’t get called back, the Lions carry a .500 or better record into Thanksgiving.

Instead, it all fell apart.  With fans publicly, and teammates privately, incensed with Harrington’s subpar play, Mariucci didn’t support his quarterback.  Instead, he made plain his frustration with Harrington, and propped up Jeff Garcia at every opportunity.  Mariucci’s failure to groom Harrington into a winner—and by extension, failure to make Millen look good—cost Mooch his job.  Dré Bly speaking this fact aloud didn’t make him a cancer—it made him honest.

Technorati Tags: nfl,detroit lions,profootballtalk.com,dré bly,matt millen,mlive.com,michael david smith

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Parallel Efforts on the defensive line & Secondary

As I work to complete my follow-up on the defensive line and secondary analysis, I want to draw your attention to three more articles attempting the exact same thing:

• Kevin Siefert, ESPN.com's NFC North blogger, published a baseline for what he intends to be a regular performance-tracking series about the Lions’ ability to stop the deep pass.  He successfully details how brutally brutal the Lions’ pass defense was last season.
• The Mathlete, a fixture over at MGoBlog, published his own scatter-plot heavy look into sacks, interceptions, and pass defense.  He and I exchanged emails in between my piece’s going up and his, and turns out we’d had a lot of similar thoughts.  He’s much, much better at this than I am, though, and he used the “expected points” formula to divine a little bit more clearly what a sack is worth.
• Finally, Blue in Greer, a regular reader here and writer over at Bleacher Report, did his own look-see into the Lions’ secondary with ProFootballFocus.com’s pressure, hit, and batted-ball data (the same figures I’m looking at for my follow-up).  His results were revealing: he found pass defense performance, when sorted by percentages of dropbacks with pressure, was all over the map.

Anyway, give these articles a thorough review while I woodshed on it.

Technorati Tags: nfl,detroit lions,espn,mgoblog,bleacher report,analysis

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