The Watchtower: Lions at Saints

This Watchtower is a little extra special to me. The last time the Lions played at New Orleans, it was the first regular season game of Jim Schwartz’s career. It was the first regular season game after the founding of this blog. And to prepare for it, I wrote the first Watchtower.

It was a rough-and-ready thing. I didn’t have my table CSS figured out, and I didn’t project a score or per-play effectiveness. Most of the piece is spent explaining the Watchtower concept, and not on analysis. However, I isolated some systemic advantages, and told the story of the game: “The most probable outcome of this game is a shootout that the Lions lose.”

Honestly, that was giving the Lions a touch more credit than they deserved. The eventual Super Bowl champion Saints were up 14-0 within what seemed like minutes of kickoff, and they barely slowed down. Drew Brees threw for six touchdowns, and images from the blowout loss were plastered all over Madden ‘10. Louis Delmas returned a fumble 65 yards for a touchdown, which made the final score 45-27 instead of 45-20. Then again, for a team fresh off 0-16 against a team about to go 13-3 en route to winning it all, it wasn’t too bad.

This time, these two teams are much more evenly matched. The Saints are 8-3, one game ahead of Atlanta in the NFC South. The Lions are 7-4, knotted up with Chicago for second place in the NFC North. With Chicago going up against patsy Kansas City, a win would mean the world for their chances of hanging with the Bears. A loss could put one more nail in the Lions’ coffin.

Sean Payton vs. Gunther Cunningham

Pay	Ornk	PgG	YpA	YpC	Gun	Drnk	PpG	DYpA	DYpC	PTS	PTSΔ	YpA	YpAΔ	YpC	YpCΔ
NYG	21st	20	7.2	3.8	TEN	29th	27.2	8.05	4.62	29	45%	8.04	16.7%	1.53	-60%
DAL	15th	20	6.7	3.6	KCC	16th	20.3	6.58	4.10	27	33%	9.59	44%	5.83	63%
NOS	1st	31.9	8.01	4.50	DET	32nd	30.9	7.80	4.42	45	41%	10.53	31%	4.49	0%
NOS	2nd	32.9	7.74	4.83	DET	18th	22.4	5.75	4.84

In previous Watchtowers, I thought I'd identified a systemic advantage for Gunther Cunningham defenses against Sean Payton offenses. But looking at the numbers today--and including the 2009 game--it's hard to come to the same conclusion.

Almost without fail, Gunther's defenses have been heavily outmanned when facing Payton's offenses. Trying to distinguish between fine shades of blowout is not a methodology that will produce strong results.

So, let's look at this season. The Saints are the second-best offense in football, scoring 32.9 points per game. No surprise, Drew Brees leads the way: the Saints are averaging 7.79 YpA. However, the Saints' running back by committee is one of the most effective platoons I've ever seen: they've chewed up ground at 4.83 yards per carry, to the tune of 1,380 yards and 12 touchdowns.

Defensively, the Lions currently rank 18th, allowing 22.4 points per game. But they've been playing much better than that; note the outstanding 5.75 yards per attempt allowed. They've been run on--allowing 4.84 YpC--but they've been great.

The reason the defensive points-allowed doesn't look that great is because of the offense and the special teams. Since the 5-0 start the defense has had to contend with the offense turning it over, the offense going three-and-out, and the kick coverage teams allowing plenty of long returns and short fields for the other team.

Still, it is what it is: opposing teams are scoring an average of 22.4 points per game on the Lions, and the Saints are much more potent than an "average" offense.

Given, though, how the Lions put the clamps on the Packers, I can't project the Saints to exceed their season average. I project the Saints to score 27-30 points, passing for 6.50-7.00 YpA, and rushing for 4.75-5.00 YpC. Without a clear systemic effect, I have low-to-medium confidence in this projection..

Mitigating/Aggravating Factors

There are several aggravating factors here, and their names are Ndamukong Suh, Chris Houston, and Louis Delmas. They will be missing, and it will be aggravating.I still think the Lions can slow down the Saints' passing attack, but it's going to be a tougher task. Many will worry about the Saints' running game--but as we've seen many times this season, the Lions can handle a potent running game.

Really, the biggest problem facing the defense is the offense.

Scott Linehan vs. Gregg Williams

Lin	Ornk	PgG	YpA	YpC	GW	Drnk	PpG	DYpA	DYpC	PTS	PTSΔ	YpA	YpAΔ	YpC	YpCΔ
MIN	8th	24.4	6.60	5.3	HOU	27th	24.8	6.20	4.49	39	60%	6.24	-5%	5.46	3%
MIN	6th	25.3	7.16	4.71	HOU	21st	19.3	6.89	3.92	34	34%	7.92	11%	4.69	0%
STL	10th	22.9	6.69	4.26	WAS	20th	19.2	7.18	4.47	37	62%	10.21	53%	5.05	19%
DET	27th	16.4	5.12	4.42	NOS	20th	21.3	6.57	4.49	20	22%	4.95	-3%	3.17	-28%
DET	4th	28.7	6.72	4.48	NOS	19th	22.9	6.52	5.03

Ah, yes, the offense. For all its struggles, the Lions offense is still the 4th-most potent in the NFL. Averaging 28.7 points per game, the Lions are still putting up points. However, the shift in per-play effectiveness has been dramatic. Going into Monday Night Football, the Lions were averaging 7.44 YpA and 2.95 YpC. Since then, as you can see, the rushing game has gotten far more potent, but the passing effectiveness has fallen off a cliff. Now the Lions are only averaging 6.72 YpA, though they’re grinding out 4.48 YpC.

This has been a reflection of both the tougher defenses the Lions have face, and Matthew Stafford’s struggles with consistency. The Saints defense, statistically, is very similar to the Lions’: 19th-ranked in scoring at 22.9 PpG, allwoing 6.52 YpA and 5.03 YpC.

In the previous Watchtower, I identified a strong trend: Linehan offenses tend to outperform expectations against Gregg Williams offenses. The situation is similar comparing Payton offenses to Cunningham defenses: in every meeting, the offense had a significant upper hand, and performed significantly above their season averages . . . until 2009.

In the last meeting between the Lions and Saints, the Lions had the 27th-ranked offense. They were averaging a pathetic 5.12 YpA through the air, and the solid 4.42 YpC couldn’t make up for it. Yet, when going up against the 20th-ranked Saints defense, the Lions scored 20 offensive points. This, despite falling well short of their usual rushing effectiveness, and slightly shy of their average YpA.

Even if I’m reaching slightly on the specific versus-Williams advantage (and, look at the numbers, I don’t think I am), the Lions typically do well against aggressive 3-4 defenses. With that in mind, I project the Lions to score 30-33 points, pass for 6.75-7.25 YpA, and rush for 5.00-5.25 YpC. I have medium-high confidence in this prediction.

Mitigating/Aggravating Factors:

Actually, there aren’t too many. Unless Stafford completely melts down—or ditching the gloves unleashes a truly magnificent performance—I don’t see much wiggle room here. I expect the Lions to be able to take advantage of the Saints pass defense . . . whether that’s early on in an upset win, or in garbage time of a blowout loss, like last time.

Conclusion

The Saints are like the mini-Packers, and the Lions are like the mini-Saints. These two teams hold up a mirror to one another, and the Saints are a little bit better in every phase of the game—except the Lions play much, much better pass defense. I could see this going either way, and the Saints have a huge advantage in the Superdome (they’re 5-0 at home).

However . . . last week I was rooting for a huge Monday Night Football win for the Saints over the Giants. Why? Because we’ve seen all too well what can happen to a team that pulls out all the stops for a huge home MNF win, and face a tough follow-up test the following Sunday. The Saints are due to come out flat, and the Lions are coming off a long week of rest and preparation.

I could sit here and flip thought-experiment coins all day, but that wouldn’t help much. I’ll just follow the numbers: The most likely outcome of the game is a 30-28 Lions win. From these numbers to the Football Gods’ ears, eh?

*** IMPORTANT: FIRESIDE CHAT WILL BE AT HALFTIME. ***

Read more...

the watchtower: lions vs. steelers

I never could leave well enough alone.

the most likely outcome involves Stafford getting rattled by the Bears, getting sacked 3-to-5 times and surrendering at least two turnovers. Despite moving the ball as well as they have all season, the Lions should score below expectations (currently 19, though a 3-game average is nearly useless). This is much less well defined, but my guess is that the Bears will match or slightly outperform their scoring expecations (also currently 19, equally shakily), with one dimension of the offense working much better than the other.

• Stafford was sacked five times, for a loss of 42 yards.
• Stafford lost a fumble on one of those sacks, and threw an interception.
• The Lions generated a season-high 398 yards of total offense, and scored 24 points--for reference, they scored 20 points off of 231 offensive yards in Week 1.
• The Bears scored 41 offensive points. As a team, they ran 20 times for 151 yards (7.55 YpC) and 3 TDs. They passed 28 times for 141 yards (5.04 YpA) and 2 TDs.

That's some profound prognostication. Unfortunately, I threw the data to the wind and kept talking:

I'm calling for another low-scoring, ugly, sack-and-turnover filled game, and a probable (but probably narrow) Bears victory.

I've said before that I'm going to continue to expand the data sets as I find appropriate.  I've decided to start including average defensive yards-per-attempt and yards-per-carry numbers. It should help highlight when the fit of offensive and defensive scheme are actually resulting in performance deltas.

Unfortunately, this week is another matchup with a paucity of reliable data. Pittsburgh offensive coordinator Bruce Arians technically came up through the NFL ranks as an assistant to Tom Moore, joining him in Peyton Manning's rookie season. However, he also spent many years in the college ranks, even serving as an assistant Bear Bryant . . . so he clearly has had many influences, and doesn't come from any specific "tree".

His first stint running his own offense was calling the plays for Butch Davis in Cleveland. After a few subpar seasons, Davis was swept aside, and Arians was hired as a WR coach by his old colleague, Bill Cowher.  Arians assisted then-OC Ken Whisenhunt for several years, ascending back into the playcalling role when Whisenhunt left for the Cardinals.

Trying to find more details about Arians' scheme, I gleefully stumbled upon a Bruce Arians breakdown by Chris Brown of Smart Football.  Arians, as Brown explains, tried to port what he learned from Tom Moore over to Cleveland, but a lack of quality quarterback play tripped him up.  Brown asserts that Arians, today, executes those principles from a modified version of the Whisenhunt offense with the Steelers.  My own eyeballs tell me there are a lot of Colts-esque 3-wide and 4-wide packages being trotted out in the Steel City than there were in ‘05.

The Whisenhunt/Arians Steelers didn’t face a Cunningham or Schwartz/Cunningham defense (for the record, new readers, I don’t count the 2006-2008 Chiefs as a “Cunningham defense”, because he merely executed Herm Edwards’ Tampa 2 scheme).  The only data we have to look at is Arians’ Browns against the Schwartz/Cunningham Titans defense.

I’ve used the Schwartz/Cunningham data sparingly in previous weeks, because we heard a lot of talk about 40% blitz and 3-3-5 nickel and Derrick Thomas and Julian Peterson and whatnot.  However, the inability of the Lions’s secondary to cover anybody at all has constricted Cunningham to calling a more conservative 4-3, in the style of Schwartz’s Titans.  

BA	Gun	Ornk	PgG	YpA	YpC	Drnk	PpG	DYpA	DYpC	PTS	YpA	INT	YpC	Sack
CLE	TEN	25th	17.8	6.01	3.24	25th	24.2	7.31	3.53	15	5.89	1	3.82	2-7
CLE	TEN	25th	17.8	6.01	3.24	25th	24.2	7.31	3.53	41	12.44	1	3.00	3-14
CLE	TEN	19th	21.5	6.65	3.98	11th	20.2	6.30	3.83	31	6.52	1	4.60	3-15

In 2001, pre-re-alignment, the Browns and Titans shared a division.  This is cool because, as regular readers of this feature know, the numbers get much stronger when there are two data points from the same year to work with.  Arians's Browns were not a potent crew, ranked 25th in the NFL with 17.8 points per game. They averaged 6.01 yards per attempt through the air, and 3.24 yards per carry on the ground.  Meanwhile, Schwartz's Titans weren't any great shakes either: also ranked 25th; allowing an average of 24.2 PpG, getting torched for 7.31 YpA, but holding runners to 3.53 YpC.

The expectations for this game would be the Browns scoring around 21 points, passing more effectively than usual, and running about at their average.  Astonishingly, the Browns' passing attack was bottled up, gaining only 5.89 yards per attempt.  Rushing for 3.82 YpC could only do so much: between 2 lost fumbles, a pick, and two sacks for seven yards lost, the Browns' ineffectiveness through the air held them to just 15 points scored.

Immediately upon seeing these numbers, I went sensed something was up. Ahh, there's the problem.  Tim Couch was rotten that day, and benched midgame. Kelly Holcomb got his first taste of NFL action that afternoon, and was mildly decent.

The second matchup between Arians's Browns and Schwartz's Titans was interesting indeed: a 41-38 shootout!  The Browns exploded for 12.44 yards per passing attempt, eviscerating the Titans' suspect pass defense.  We see that Tim Couch was every bit the Golden Boy on this day, going 20-of-27 for 336 yards and 3 TDs.  He also threw a pick, and was sacked 3 times--but when the ground game got only 87 yards on 29 caries (3.00 YpC), there's only so perfect you can be.

This illustrates Brown's point above: quality quarterback play makes Arians's downfield passing offense much more powerful.

In the final meeting between these two coordinators, Arians's Browns were the 19th-ranked scoring offense, scoring 21.5 PpG on the wings of a pretty-potent 6.65 YpA passing attack.  They also improved their ground attack, using a two-back combo of Jamel White and William Green to gain 3.98 YpC.  However, Schwartz's Titans had taken a much bigger step forward, being the 11th-ranked scoring defense, allowing 6.30 YpA and only 3.83 YpC.

I'd expect scoring to be right about at average for the Browns--and instead, they put up 31 points.  Couch was again incredibly efficient, completing 36 of 50 passes for 326 yards, 3 TDs, and just one INT. He wasn't blowing the Titans up downfield, as the 6.52 YpA shows--but completing 72% of your passes, and throwing one pick in 50 attempts is truly excellent quarterback play.  If the Browns hadn't lost three fumbles, and if Couch's only pick hadn't been taken back to the house by Andre Dyson, this would have been a Browns blowout.

The evidence is clear, and the verdict is terrifying: With quality quarterback play, and/or suspect secondary play, Bruce Arians's multi-WR downfield passing offense is disproportionately successful against Jim Schwartz's balanced 4-3, regardless of talent.

Lin	Dick	Ornk	PgG	YpA	YpC	Drnk	PpG	DYpA	DYpC	PTS	YpA	INT	YpC	Sack
STL	PIT	28th	16.4	5.63	3.78	2nd	16.8	5.27	3.98	24	5.60	2	6.00	1-9
MIN	HOU	6th	25.3	7.16	4.71	21st	19.3	6.89	3.92	34	7.92	0	4.69	3-8

This table looks a little stubby; that's because we only have one real data point to work with.  I fleshed it out a little with his protegé, former Steelers DC Dom Capers, but that data point is really for "entertainment purposes only".

In 2007, Linehan's hobbled Rams offense met Lebeau's typically terrifying Steeler defense.  The Rams were the 28th-best scoring offense, mustering 16.4 PpG.  They passed for only 5.63 yards per attempt, but managed to grind out 3.78 yards per carry behind a decimated O-line.  Meanwhile, the vicious Steelers D allowed only 16.8 points per game, 5.27 YpA, and 3.98 YpC.  Note how eerily similar those numbers are . . . it’s almost like the Steelers were the #2 defense in the league just by turning every team they played into the Rams.

One would expect that the Terrible Towels would transform the Rams into, like, the Double Rams, with a logarithmically smaller offensive output. What happened instead was a relative offensive explosion: 24 points. The Rams balanced their typical 5.60 YpA passing game with a surprisingly effective ground game; they averaged six yards per carry. Though they carried only 15 times, pounding Steven Jackson inside was clearly enough to keep the Steelers honest; Bulger was sacked only once.

One might think that the Rams came back in garbage time, but no: the Rams trailed 17-24 at the half, 24-31 after three quarters, and the final margin came on a Bulger pick-six at the bitter end. The Rams were legitimately in this game, moving the ball and keeping pace for 50+ minutes, despite having no real business doing so. We saw a similar effect with Linehan's track record against Gregg Williams's similar defense: the balance of an inside running game and downfield passing game gives a high-edge-blitz defense fits.

Let's look briefly at the scorched-earth napalming that Linehan's 6th-ranked Vikings offense put on Dom Capers' 21st-ranked Texans defense. 34 points, 7.92 YpA, 4.69 YpC. Culpepper was 36-of-50 for 396 yards, 5 TDs, and 0 INTs. Vikings backs ran 26 times for 122 yards. It probably would have been worse if the Vikes hadn't been flagged 10 times for 75 yards.

Given the only data point on LeBeau, and fitting it into the broader picture painted by the Capers and Williams info, I think I'm safe to say that Scott Linehan's balanced offense significantly outperforms expectations against aggressive, blitzing 3-4 defenses like LeBeau's.

Roethlisberger should have an incredibly effective day, smoking the Lions' subpar secondary; completing at least 70% of his passes. Whether that's for 350 yards and 4 TDs or 250 yards and 2 TDs will depend on the Lions' ability to stop Rashard Mendenhall--and then blitz to get pressure on Ben.

Likewise, if Matt Stafford, Kevin Jones Smith [Great Googily Moogily! I knew I'd make this typo someday], and Calvin Johnson are healthy enough to play, and play well, this could be an intense shootout. The Steelers will likely give Johnson & Johnson plenty of cushion on the outside, and blitz the OLBs. Look for Linehan to attack this space with routes out of the backfield and TEs. Likewise, the Steelers will do a lot of blitzing off the edge; Smith should be able to find seams up the middle.

Duante Culpepper proved last week that he's a dumpoff artist and no more. If Stafford can't go, the corners will press, the safeties will creep up, and the ground game will be ground to a halt. Either way, though, I think we're just talking about margin of loss. As I said about the similar pass-first, blitz-heavy Saints, the most likely outcome of this game is a shootout that the Lions lose. Unless and until the Lions can rush the passer and cover the pass . . . get used to this.

Read more...

The watchtower: lions vs. redskins

In last week's watchtower, we looked at the historical matchups of Gunther Cunningham defenses versus Brad Childress offenses, and Scott Linehan offenses versus Dungy-style Tampa 2 defenses. Here's what I came up with:

Given greater or equal talent, Scott Linehan’s balanced offense significantly outperforms its averages when facing a Dungy-style Tampa 2, especially with the run. Given lesser talent, Linehan’s offense meets or mildly outperforms expectations against a T2. However, a disproportionate amount of sacks and turnovers seem to be created by a Tampa 2 when facing a Linehan offense. It’s that pesky turnover thing that will make the difference; if Minnesota sacks Stafford five or six times and generates two or three turnovers, the Lions will have an extremely hard time keeping pace, even if the ground game is working well (and scheme or no, nobody runs on the Williams Wall!). However, Minnesota’s lack of a downfield passing game should allow Gunther Cunningham to turn up the defensive heat to an extreme level, which should have a disproportionately disruptive effect on the Vikings’ offense. Given how amazing Adrian Peterson looked in the Vikings’ first game, and how inept the Lions looked against the Saints, it’s tempting to say this will be a blowout—however, the Vikings didn’t blow out the Browns, and I don’t think this one will be a blowout either. It appears as though the Lions have a decided systemic advantage on both sides of the ball, assuming Gunther feels safe enough to crank up the heat. It remains to be seen if those advantages will be enough to overcome the gap in talent on both sides of the ball. Therefore, the most likely result of this game is a closely contested, medium-to-low scoring slugfest, with a lot of turnovers and penalties. It is slightly more likely that Minnesota’s talent overcomes Detroit’s systemic advantages, but this will be a volatile game in Detroit’s home opener.

This method of prediction--breaking down historial scheme vs. scheme data, and layering on subjective analysis--has its flaws. Indeed, the brighter analytical minds of the football universe have been privately critical of my work so far. While I take said critiques to heart, I think I may be on to something.

• I found that Linehan's offense seems to be unusually successful against Dungy-style Tampa 2 defenses; Detroit was so successful on the ground that the Vikings abandoned their base defense, and put eight men in the box.
• Linehan's teams seem to turn the ball over frequently when facing a Dungy-style defense.  I noted that avoiding that would be key to the Lions' chances for victory.  Instead, the Lions turned it over three times, and that was arguably the difference in the game.
• I projected that Minnesota's lack of a consistent deep threat would allow Gunther to blitz, thereby disrupting the Childress offense. It did, he did, and it did; the Lions nearly carried a shutout into halftime. In the end, the turnovers--and resultant short fields for the Vikes--were too numerous to overcome.
• It was indeed an ugly game marred by sacks, turnovers, and controversial calls--most notably the phantom Gosder Cherilus "chop block" that negated a long gainer by Megatron.

This analysis isn't anything more than that: analysis. But rather than pretend that Dominic Raiola had some sort of secret Pat Williams kyrptonite in his pocket, I prefer to believe that the interaction of schemes provided an opportunity for Kevin Smith to succeed . . . and I know of no other way to project or predict such interactions. I said as long as I find this analysis to have predictive value, I'd continue--and I do, and so I shall.

Zorn	Gun	Ornk	PpG	YpA	YpC	Drnk	PpG	PTS	YpA	INT	YpC	FumL	Sack
SEA	KCC	12th	21.1	6.47	3.45	13th	20.1	31	7.2	0	2.1	0-0	3-9
SEA	KCC	19th	20.0	5.84	4.27	19th	22.1	17	5	1	5.5	4-1	5-37
SEA	KCC	19th	20.0	5.84	4.27	19th	22.1	22	5.33	3	5.7	1-1	3-16
SEA	KCC	14th	20.9	5.96	3.97	11th	19.7	28	6.6	2	2.94	0-0	2-8

Jim Zorn, former Lions quarterbacks coach, has only been an offensive coordinator for as long as he's been a head coach--this is his second season as anything more senior than a position coach. However, he's been a top assistant to Mike Holmgren in Seattle since 2001, and runs that flavor of Walsh-style offense in Washington, so I decided to extend my reach back to Seattle-era Holmgren offenses.

This opened up something I've been anxious to see: two meetings between the same schemes in the same year.  In 2000, Holmgren's Seahawks met Cunningham's Chiefs twice; this should give us an idea of how reliable our single-sample data has been.  I don't want to get ahead of myself though, so let's look at the prior meeting first.

In 1999, the Seahawks brought the 12th-best scoring offense (21.1 ppg) up against Gunther's 13th-best scoring defense (20.1 ppg). You'd expect the Seahawks to match their usual output, and they roughly did, scoring 24 points. While they outperformed expectations through the air (6.47 ypa avg., 7.20 actual), their already-weak running game was completely ineffective (3.45 ypc avg., 2.14 actual). They didn't simply abandon the run, either—that’s 60 yards on 28 carries! The three sacks might be interesting, but paired with zero turnovers, it doesn't point to anything systemic.  Let's get to the really interesting case study: 2000.

In 2000, the Seahawks were a below-median scoring offense, posting up exactly 20 points per game (19th). Meanwhile, Cunningham's defense was also ranked 19th, allowing 22.1 points per game. The offense scored very near expectations: 17 and 22 points in the two games.  In both meetings, the offense passed below their season averages: only 5 and 5.33 yards per attempt, versus the average 5.84. In a reverse of the 1999 data, though, they ran with success far above average: 5.47 and 5.72 yards per carry, over the average 4.27. The disruption numbers, however, are consistently high: 5 & 3 sacks for -37 and -16 yards, 4 & 1 fumbles forced (1 and 1 recovered), and 1 & 3 INTs.

What are we to make of this? I'm excited by the strong parallels in the stats between the two games. This is exactly what I was hoping to see; it buoys my assertions that the 16-game averages can roughly capture annual swings in talent and execution. There's a quirk, though: when the Seahawks had a strong passing game but weaker running game, the run was shut down--but the passing attack outperformed expectations. Then in 2000, when the Seahawks were much better on the ground than through the air (thanks Shaun Alexander), the Chiefs took away the pass, but were steamrolled with the run. Before drawing any conclusions, I'll go to the last data point.

In 2006, Seattle had a fairly balanced offense, scoring 20.9 points per game (14th), averaging 5.96 yards per pass attempt and 3.97 yards per carry. Cunningham's Chiefs were the 11th-ranked scoring defense, allowing 19.7 points per game. Though the Seahawks, at first blush, exceeded expecations, 7 of their 28 points came from a defensive TD--putting them right where you'd expect them, at 21 points. Now, we see a reversion to the 1999 pattern: the Seahawks passed for 6.60 YpA, 0.7 yards above average--and rushed for a measley 2.94 YpC, 1.03 yards below average.

I looked at the 1999 data, and the Seahawks were ranked 24th in the NFL in rushing attempts (25.5 per game), and 24th in yards per carry (3.45). In 2000, however, the Seahawks ran almost exactly as often (25.19 CpG, ranked 23rd), but were markedly more successful when doing so (4.27 YpC, ranked 9th). It seems as though Cunningham was almost "taking what the offense gives him"--simply blitzing both the run and pass, generating many turnovers and sacks, interrupting the scoring success of what a team does well, and denying what they don't. As this is the guiding principle of Cunningham's defense--extreme blitzing, and a focus on touchdown denial vs. yardage denial--I'm willing to say that given equal talent and execution, there is no systemic advantage for either Jim Zorn's WCO or Gunther Cunningham's hyperagressive 4-3.

If this week's game follows the above trends, Clinton Portis will have an above-average day on the ground, but the Lions' blizting will disrupt and confound Jason Campbell and the Redskins' ho-hum passing game. Point production by the Redskins should be right at expectations--which, for 2009 so far, means 13.0; they're ranked 31st.

Lin	Bla.	Ornk	PpG	YpA	YpC	Drnk	PpG	PTS	YpA	INT	YpC	FumL	Sack
MIN	CHI	8	24.4	6.60	5.3	25th	23.7	19	8.36	2	4.24	2-1	1-6
MIN	CHI	8	24.4	6.60	5.3	25th	23.7	24	7.20	0	3.4	1-1	0-0
MIN	CHI	6	25.3	8.18	4.71	22nd	21.6	25	8.23	0	5.18	3-1	3-16
MIN	CHI	6	25.3	8.18	4.71	22nd	21.6	10	6.53	1	4.68	1-0	2-7
STL	WAS	30	14.5	5.67	3.95	6th	18.5	19	5.23	0	2.92	1-1	2-12

On the other side of the ball, the analysis unfortunately gets murkier. 'Skins DC Greg Blache has been in Washington since 2004, but only as the defensive line coach until Zorn took over. Moreover, Blache was not a product of the Gregg Williams "tree"; he was a refugee from Dick Jauron's ouster in Chicago. While Blache allegdly had significant input into the Williams defenses of 2004-2007, Blache apparently removed many of the more exotic blitz packages, and called fewer blitzes in 2008. Further, the signing of Albert Haynesworth and drafting of Brian Orakpo bolster the notion that Blache's scheme and playcalling will more closely resemble the stout but staid defense Blache put in place during his time in the Windy City . . . therefore, I'll use Linehan's matchups against the pre-2004 Bears defenses, and the 2008 Redskins for my analysis.

In 2002, Linehan's Vikings met Blache's Bears twice, again giving us a good look at in-season trends. Linehan's Vikings were ranked 8th in the NFL in scoring offense, with 24.4 points per game. They passed for 6.6 yards per attempt, and rolled with an outstanding 5.3 yards per carry. The Bears scoring defense was subpar; they allowed 23.7 PpG, slotting them 25th in the league. You'd expect the Vikings to score well above their already-prodigous average, but don't; they only muster 19 and 24 points in two tries. While they were very successful in passing the ball (8.36 & 7.20 YpA, 6.60 avg.), the vaunted Vikings ground game ground to a halt (4.24 & 3.4 YpC, 5.3 avg.).

Disruption numbers were low (2 picks; 3 fumbles, 1 lost; 1 sack for -6 yards for both games COMBINED), but it's undeniable that the Blache defense smothered an excellent Linehan ground game with far inferior talent, and the success of the passing game wasn't enough to do anything but equalize the offensive output to normalcy.

In 2003, both teams were slightly bettter; Minnesota was the 6th-best scoring offense in the NFL with 25.3 PpG, and Chicago was the 22nd-ranked scoring defense with 21.6 PpG allowed.  The passing attack was extremely potent, averaging 8.18 YpA, and the running game was still solid (4.71 YpC), despite losing over half of a yard per carry from the previous season.  Expectations would be that the Vikings outperform their usual scoring average—and in the first game, they do, scoring 25 points.  However, in the second game, they took a pratfall, mustering only 10. 

Here we have the first discrepancy between two contests in the same season.  In the first matchup, the Vikings slightly outperformed their 16-game averages both through the air and on the ground (8.23 YpA & 5.18 YpC, vs 8.18 & 4.71 avgs.).  However, in the second contest, the Vikings managed a mere 10 points, passed for only 6.53 YpA, and ran for an average 4.68 YpC.  The only real variance between the two games that I can find is that the first game happened in mid-September in the Metrodome, and the second happened in mid-December at Soldier Field.  It’s entirely possible that the climate and crowd were decided factors in limiting the Vikings’ high-flying offense—though I admit, that’s nothing but conjecture.

There's one more data point to look at, so let's do: last season, just two games after Linehan's ouster, his Rams faced Blache's Redskins. I realize that this won't perfectly capture Linehan's playcalling tendencies, etc., but it's the only data point we've got with Blache leading the Redskins' defense. The Rams were fairly well wretched that season--the 30th scoring offense, ekeing out just 14.5 points per game. The passing offense could only manage 5.67 YpA, and the rushing game was only good for 3.95 YpC. Meanwhile, Washington's defense was the 6th-best scoring defense in football, allowing only 18.5 PpG. One would expect a truly wimpy offensive output, and yet the Rams scored 19 points. How?

Well, their only touchdown came from a interception return, and the remainder of the scoring came from kicker Josh Brown's foot. YpA and YpC were both depressed (5.23 YpA vs. 5.67 avg.; 2.92 YpC vs. 3.95 YpC avg.). Disruption numbers again weren't great, but it hardly mattered; the defense did their job. Therefore, I'm concluding that regardless of talent or execution, Greg Blache's philosophy of a strong front four and committment to run-stopping disproportionately slows Scott Linehan's balanced offense. Where does this leave us? With the burden entirely in the hands of the respective quarterbacks. Given the Redskins' meager offensive output so far, and the lack of any decided systemic advantage for either the Redskins' offense or the Lions defense, the Redskins will move the ball only if Jason Campbell can be successful deep and force Gunther Cunnigham to call off the dogs. Meanwhile, the Redskins' impressive apparent advantage when matching up their defensive system against the Lions' offense means that Matt Stafford will have to minimize turnovers and connect with Calvin Johnson deep.

In my opinion, the most likely scenario is an absolutely brutal game, a physical brawl where both teams try but fail to control the ball with the running game, sacks and turnovers abound, penalty flags fall from the sky like rain . . . and the team whose quarterback performs the best wins.

Read more...

the watchtower: lions at saints

When I was a little kid, children’s television was in the middle of changing from puppets on Saturday morning to a 20-channel, 24-hour, on-demand, companion-Web-site multimedia extravaganza.  There was an all-kid’s-programming network, Nickelodeon, but there wasn’t enough actual programming.  What to do?  Re-run old programming, of course!

So it came to be that I would watch old episodes of Lassie, in all of their black-and-white glory.  One of the recurring characters was the park ranger, who would sometimes be shown at his post, in a forest fire watchtower.

It seems like it would be easy to just, you know, look for fire—but without knowing exactly where in all those miles of forest a fire is, a lone ranger couldn’t possibly prevent it from spreading in time.  But by spotting the vector to the smoke from the tower, and with help from some known reference points, he can find the heart of the blaze.

Using known variables like the latitude and longitude of the tower, the position of the sun, the direction and size of the smoke, etc., he could input some numbers into pre-calculated tables, work out the rough location of the smoke’s source, hop in his truck, and go tell those punk kids to douse their campfire.

For this season, the Lions are essentially a blank slate.  We’ve never seen most of these players, they’ve never played with each other, and they’re being plugged into all-new coaching, training, conditioning, and schemes.  So, for this season, I’m going to whip out some tables and numbers of my own, and see if I can match up the Lions, scheme for scheme, with their opponents.

Lin.	Wil.	OR	Opg	Ypa	Ypc	DR	Dpg	Pts	Ypa	Int	Ypc	Fum	Sck
MIN	BUF	8	24.4	6.60	5.30	27	24.8	39	6.24	0	5.46	5-3	5-45
MIN	BUF	6	25.3	8.18	4.72	5	16.6	18	6.80	0	2.89	0-0	3-15
STL	WAS	10	22.9	6.69	4.26	20	19.2	37	10.21	0	5.05	1-1	1-6

What does all this mean?  The first two columns represent each coach/coordinator, and the team they they were coaching at the time they played each other.  The “OR” and “DR” are the points-per-game rank of their offense and defense, respectively.  This should give a general idea of the talent and execution level of the schemes—you see Linehan’s units were ranked 8th, 6th, and 10th in scoring offense in the three games his teams played against a Gregg Williams defense.  The “Opg” and “Dpg” figures are the actual per-game points either scored or allowed by the  units during the given contest. “Ypa” and “Ypc” are passing yards per attempt, and rushing yards per carry.   “Pts” is points scored in the game; “Int” is interceptions.  “Pyds” and “Ryds” are the total passing and rushing yards accumulated. “Ypa” and “Ypc” are passing yards-per-attempt and rushing yards-per-carry, and “Fum” and “Sck” are fumbles-lost and sacks-yardage.

In the year of the first contest, we see Linehan’s offense scoring 24.4 ppg, and the Bills allowing 24.8 ppg.  The NFL-relative rankings show that the Vikings were a talented offense indeed, but the Bills’ defense was . . . lacking.  The result was explosive; 39 points (despite three lost fumbles), and 5.46 yards per carry for 213 yards.  5 sacks for 45 yards lost really hurts the team passing  stats and team yards-per-attempt; with in-his-youth Daunte Culpepper at the helm, that’s scary. 

It looks like despite Linehan's three-man RBBC running all over everywhere, and a mobile QB in the pocket, Williams’ pass rush prevented the run advantage from developing into a passing advantage as well.  Still, that kind of wanton running success is not to be discounted—and we see that passing-yards-per-attempt and rushing yards-per-attempt were right in line with the average for the year.  It looks as though Williams’s blitzing, though effective, merely prevented the Vikings’ passing game from exploding far above average.

Let's look at the next meeting.  Linehan’s offense has improved in execution and talent--but Williams’s defense has exploded, going from the 27th-ranked scoring defense to the 5th.  This immediately shows up in the stats.  Though the Vikings were scoring 25.3 points per game, passing for 8.18 yards per attempt, and rushing for 4.72 yards per carry that season, against the Bills they scored only 18, passed for 6.80, and rushed for 2.89.  Again we see high pressure; Culpepper is sacked 3 times for 15 yards.  Minnesota’s offensive output for that game is much closer to the Bills’ defensive season average than their own.  Therefore, given equal talent and execution, Gregg Williams’s attacking 3-4 defense will disproportionately disrupt Scott Linehan’s balanced offense.

Finally, the last game.  Linehan’s unit is again one of the better in the game, ranked 10th in ppg output with 22.9.  Williams’ is mediocre, ranked 20th with 19.2 ppg allowed.  The expected outcome would be Minnesota matching their season average, or mildly exceeding it, but no—the Rams exploded for 37 points, passing for a whopping 10.21 yards per attempt, and rushing for a stout 5.05 yards per carry.  Also, look at the sacks: just one for six yards.  As all three metrics of output--per-play passing, per-play rushing, and points scored—are way above their averages for the season, I’m going to say that given superior talent and execution, and/or excellent pass protection, Scott Linehan’s balanced offense disproportionately gives Gregg Williams’ attacking 3-4 defense fits.

Now, the other way around: Gunther Cunningham's 4-3 "with 3-4 principles" (extreme blitz ratio, hard edge pressure, funneling the run inside) versus Sean Payton's pass-heavy offense:

Pay.	Gun.	OR	Opg	Ypa	Ypc	DR	Dpg	Pts	Ypa	Int	Ypc	Fum	Sck
NYG	KCC	21	18.4	6.26	4.19	23	21.5	13	6.12	3	3.16	1-0	1-7
NYG	TEN	22	20.0	7.20	3.80	11	20.2	29	7.86	0	2.48	0-0	1-0
DAL	KCC	15	20.3	6.68	3.57	16	20.3	31	9.76	0	4.60	1-0	4-16

In the first matchup, neither the offense nor defense possesses exceptional talent.  The offense is scoring 18.4 ppg, and the defense allowing 21.5 .  You would expect the offense to mildly outperform its average—yet, that doesn’t occur: they muster only 13 points. 

The per-play passing success—6.26 ypa vs. 6.12 ypa—doesn’t significantly vary, but the running game is throttled down from 4.19 ypc to 3.16.  The Chiefs also force three interceptions from Kerry Collins, and sack him once.  Since we have more data in this matchup, let’s keep looking before drawing any conclusions.

The second game is a bit of an outlier, as Gunther is only a linebackers coach here—but the DC is Jim Schwartz, so like referee Mills Lane, I’ll allow it.  In this case, the Titans’ D is ranked 11th in the NFL, and the Giants’ offense is ranked 22nd.  However, the ppg averages are 20.3 allowed and 20.0 scored, so I would expect Payton’s offense to mildly underperform.  Instead, they rack up 29 points, despite running with far less success (3.80 avg., 2,48 actual), and passing only a little above average (7.20 avg., 7.86 actual).  

However, look at the big plays: 0 INTs, 0 fumbles, 1 sack for no lost yards.  Despite having good talent, and swallowing the run, Schwartz does not disrupt the rhythm of Payton’s passing offense, and so the Titans are disproportionately scored upon.

In the third game, the Cowboys are much more talented than either of Payton’s previous Giants units, and are ranked 15th in scoring output.  Cunningham’s Chiefs are ranked 16th—and both units’ scoring average is the same:  20.3.  I would strongly expect a Cowboy score of around 20.  Somehow, the Cowboys again produce far above expectations, scoring 31 points.  They pass much better than usual (6.68 avg., 9.76 actual), and run much better than usual, too (3.57 avg, 4.60 actual).  Cunningham’s defense produces plenty of sacks, 4 for a loss of 16, but, crucially, forces no turnovers.  This leads me to believe that given equal talent, Cunningham’s hyperagressive 4-3 is extremely effective against Payton’s pass-heavy offense, but only if that aggression leads to mistakes and turnovers—otherwise, the holes in the defense will be exploited. Effective quarterback play may neutralize the defensive advantage.

Last season, there was one more meeting between Payton’s Saints and Cunningham’s Chiefs.  However, though Cunningham was the coordinator in name, he was executing coach Herman Edwards’ Tampa 2.  As we’re trying to isolate scheme against scheme, including that data would only throw off the results.

So, where does this leave us? We know that the Saints have struggled on defense as of late; last season they were the 26th-best scoring defense, and the 23rd-best yardage defense. If you factor in the difficulty of transitioning to a new base alignment, the Saints may again be afflicted with one of the worst defenses in the NFL. The Lions' offense does have an edge in talent; Kevin Smith and Calvin Johnson should both prove very difficult for the Saints to stop.  If Matt Stafford begins the game looking for Johnson deep, the Lions could quickly rock the Saints' defense back on their heels. However, if the Saints' radical revamp of their defense is an immediate net positive, or if Stafford throws an early pick, the advantage will swing back to the home team.

Though there's historical evidence that a decent Cunningham defense, when successful, is disproportionately disruptive of a Payton offense, the talent gulf between the Lions' D and the Saints' O is enormous. Unless the Lions generate three or more turnovers, I don't see their defense having any kind of success in slowing the Saints down.

Therefore, the most probable outcome of this game is a shootout that the Lions lose. There is a chance that the Lions' defense disrupts the passing game early, and that the Lions score on their first two posessions, thereby allowing the defense to safely turn up the heat--and the offense to put it in the cooler. However, the offense will have to overcome a systemic disadvantage with talent, and the defense will have to overcome a significant talent gap with a perfectly-executed gameplan.

Read more...